

















Andrew Hoskins' research connects multiple aspects of the emergent digital society: 
media, memory, conflict, security, and privacy, to explore holistically the interplay of 
contemporary media and memory ecologies. He currently holds an AHRC Research 
Fellowship, exploring the intersecting and contesting roles of individual, organizational 
and institutional memory, through an original ethnography of the UK’s Army Historical 
Branch (the ‘keepers’ of the official operational record of the British Army). His latest 
major book (with Professor John Tulloch) is Risk and Hyperconnectivity: Media, 
Memory, Uncertainty (Oxford University Press, 2015). Hoskins and Tulloch argue for 
an interdisciplinary dialogue between the three major intellectual paradigms that have 
dealt separately with risk events: risk theory, neoliberalization theory and connectivity 
theory. 
Professor Hoskins is founding Editor-in-Chief of the Sage journal of Memory Studies, 
founding Co-Editor of the Palgrave Macmillan book series Memory Studies, and 





Media have always had an important role in shaping one’s perception of 
war, namely by putting emphasis on specific episodes or images that 
eventually come to represent the event as a whole. You recently proposed 
the concept of ‘diffused war’ to refer to a new paradigm of war in which the 
notion of mediatization becomes a decisive factor in the way war is 
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conducted and remembered. What is exactly the importance of the media 
and mediatization within this paradigm?  
 
In War and Media, Ben O’Loughlin and I identify the emergence of “diffused war”: a 
new paradigm of war in which (i) the mediatization of war (ii) makes possible more 
diffuse causal relations between action and effect, (iii) creating greater uncertainty for 
policymakers in the conduct of war.  
However, the field of mediatization is growing fast and is complex, and it is important 
to be clear of how this is defined. I define mediatization as the process by which 
everyday life is increasingly embedded in and penetrated by connectivity: the process of 
shifting interconnected individual, social and cultural dependency on media, for 
maintenance, survival, and growth.  
It is crucial to engage with this field and its history as does a recent volume on the 
Mediatization of Communication that I have contributed to. Whereas, unfortunately, 
there are some scholars who dismiss the term and its influence too cheaply, as was the 
case in a so-called ‘commentary’ piece published recently in a journal that should know 
better. A principal problem with a new paradigm is that resistance comes precisely 
from those who have too much invested in the status quo, and in modes of analysis that 
are no longer fit for purpose. 
 
If, up until a few years ago, mainstream media monopolized warfare 
representation, the “connective turn” has significantly changed this 
scenario, opening room to diversified (and divergent) ways of seeing, 
representing and even waging war (e.g. bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s 
communications or, more recently, the videotaped execution of hostages 
by ISIS as retribution). How would you say the coexistence of Big Media 
and Small Media in the “new media ecology” is impacting this paradigm of 
war? Do Big Media and Small Media still behave differently in their 
mediatization of war?  
 
The very idea of ‘diversification’ is overdone. This is not a question of coexistence but 
rather the continuing imposition of a mainstream whereby established and emergent 
media constantly remediate and renew each other. To understand war and conflict 
requires study of the connectivity between media and the ways in which the 
mainstream directs users/audiences towards the content of other media.  
John Tulloch and I, in our book Risk and Hyperconnectivity: Media, Memory, 
Uncertainty, out next year, examine precisely these new relations. Through a series of 
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case studies we explore the shift in a range of discourses towards attributing a 
particular power and influence to emergent over established media. This is manifested 
in, for example, the volume and the ease of mining of so-called ‘Big Data’ that attracts a 
certain mode of superficial analysis, as contrasted with broader and more complex 
media ecology analyses which seek to uncover the dynamic connectivities between 
different media rather than being overdependent on a single medium as the core corpus 
for investigation. 
 
The “mediatization” of war is increasingly pluralized, with ever more 
points of view often colliding with each other. The public is no longer 
restricted solely to a journalistic perspective; instead, they have access to a 
myriad of sources (public and private) that bring visibility to what takes 
place behind the curtain. The soldier’s inside view of war has always 
existed, with war diaries and photographic albums, but this “inside view” 
has become noticeably less private, from the pictures of Abu Ghraib to 
atrocity footage. What changes has this public appearance of an inside view 
of war brought about?  
 
More widely there has been a greater personalization of warfare, but this is not just a 
matter of the greater mobility and penetration of media. For example, General Dannatt, 
the former Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, encouraged a more personal 
connection between soldiers and the public in the UK. But this I think confused the role 
of the Afghanistan mission even more in the public mind, with a greater emphasis on 
soldiers as victims. 
 
Images of war show as much as they hide. Despite the fact that recent 
conflicts are characterized by an overabundance of images that flood 
manifold media (e.g. 9/11), it is also true that many aspects of war and 
conflict remain unmediated and, therefore, unseen (the capture and killing 
of bin Laden, for example, replaced by the ‘situation room’ photo). Do you 
think that this hypervisibility of modern warfare may lead us to forget that 
a critical facet of the “mediatized warfare” is precisely to manage the 
(in)visibility of those events? Does hypervisibility make controlling what is 
seen and what is left hidden more difficult?  
 
In new work with O’Loughlin, we argue that the ‘weight’ of the medium (following 
Sontag) is found just below rather than on its representational surface. It is the sense of 
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a permanent state of hiding – of a continuity or mediality of images of atrocity that are 
always there to be found, and which could at any time be shown, that changes the 
relationship of the connected new mass always vulnerable to the exposure of what they 
are increasingly reminded of as being always only a click away.  
So, we are not confronted by an abundance of images, but we are confronted by the 
knowledge of the abundance and the nature of images out there. So, rather than the 
mainstream of news being weakened by the volume of images available to the new 
mass, they have instead deepened and become more conscious of their role as powerful 
modulators of terror in giving us reminders of their capacity to hide or to not show. 
 
Even though the mediatization of war brings war closer in some ways, it 
also keeps it more distant in others. The changes in the “logistics of 
military perception”, to use Virilio’s terms, such as remote technologies of 
visualization and warfare, have brought a diversification of means of 
seeing war, but also a progressive distance from the battlefield, not only 
for the public but for the military forces themselves, who tend to step away 
from a physical warfare and engage in more remote operations (drones, 
long-distance missiles, cyberwarfare…) that are extremely difficult to 
register visually. How does this affect the way the public perceives and 
remembers war?  
 
Some technologies of memory bring audiences closer to the frontline of military action 
(helmet cams and online archives), whereas some technologies of warfare move 
military action out of journalistic reach (drones and computer viruses). But the public 
is still nonetheless fed a vision of warfare that fits journalistic assumptions as to what a 
mainstream’s presumed audiences will recognize and tolerate as war. 
 
 
In spite of the proliferation of new audio-visual instruments and strategies 
to cover war, there is also a turn to past templates of war representation. 
New media may promote new ways of seeing war, but apparently there is a 
set of cultural expectations on what war should look and feel like that 
provide a certain continuity to mediated memory and still play a decisive 
role within the diffused immediacy of events. This process may, however, 
lead to a congruent effect and a redundant narrative. That is the case of 
war, terrorism and risk, whose differences have become increasingly 
blurred. Images from all sorts of different localized conflicts – from Iraq to 
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Syria and Gaza - resemble each other so much that they can barely be 
distinguished. Why is that? Is this a consequence of a standardized 
“mediatization” of conflict?  
 
Under these conditions there appears to be two incompatible memorial trajectories. 
The first is the new flux of everything connected, remediated, networked in some kind 
of all-equivocating mesh of journalism liberated from its profession, or so the now-
familiar story goes: an almighty diffusion of memory. The second is more of the old: the 
continuity of the past through its constant referencing and re-referencing in a 
journalistic déjà vu.  
So, there is a continuous coupling of Big Media’s iconic trajectories of 20th century 
warfare with how recent and emergent war and conflicts are framed and seen. Of 
course these two memorial trajectories are shaped by each other and it is this that 
produces a ‘new memory’ of warfare, but as I mentioned earlier, it is more of the old 
that seems to be winning out. 
 
 
Given the increasing portability and storage capacities of new media, 
memories of war are much more accessible but also less imprinted in one’s 
individual memory, and ultimately, in collective memory. Digital 
technology allows for mobility, immediacy and wider distribution, while 
defying a more stable or settled memory. What are the prospects for 
individual memories in the shift from collective to connective memory? 
 
This is a very good question. I have long argued that what was once an ‘active’ memory, 
a human memory that had to work to sustain a continuity of past – of identity, of place, 
of relationships – is fundamentally weakened with the shift from reliance to 
dependency on the search devices and connectivities of our machines. Memory in our 
‘post-scarcity’ culture has become less about remembering and more about knowing 
where to look. 
	  
